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Philosophers have long invoked certain priority relations among facts to characterize 
their views. Materialists, for example, typically hold that mental facts obtain in virtue 
of, or because of, physical facts; and ethical naturalists typically hold that moral facts 
are grounded in non-moral ones. But for a long time, the relation indicated by those 
locutions – “in virtue of”, “because”, and “grounded in” – has not been made the topic 
of inquiry in its own right. This has changed in the last few years: grounding has 
become a lively and fertile area of research. To the best of my knowledge, the work 
under review, edited by two of the most pre-eminent contributors to the topic, is the 
first book-length publication that is mainly devoted to grounding. It also contains 
paper on the related topics of ontological dependence and metaontology.  
 
The book consists of a 36 pages long introduction by the editors, and eleven research 
papers of excellent quality. If one paper deserves to be especially highlighted, it is 
surely Kit Fine’s “Guide to Ground” (ch. 1). Grounding is a topic in what we might 
call “hyperintensional metaphysics”, which is concerned with distinctions that cannot 
be illuminated in the framework of possible worlds. It is largely due to Fine’s 
influence (in particular, his paper “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical 
Perspectives 8 (1994)) that hyperintensional metaphysics has become a respectable 
and flourishing field in the last twenty years. Fine also seems at the source of 
contemporary interest in grounding. His article “The Question of Realism” 
(Philosophers’ Imprint, 2001) argues that the debate about realism is most fruitfully 
framed in terms of ground. But Fine did not articulate the notion in detail in that 
paper. He did so in subsequent years, however, presenting his work all over the world, 
and circulating drafts. But much of his work on the topic remained unpublished for a 
long time. Two technical papers have come out in recently years, but the 44-pages 
“Guide to Ground” appears to be the flagship article among Fine’s contributions to 
the topic. As its title suggests, it starts with a helpful and accessible introduction to 
grounding, and Fine’s approach to it. The reader then soon finds herself on a guided 
tour de force, though. Fine presents a host of intriguing distinctions, observations, and 
applications. A particular gem is the distinction between something being ungrounded 
– like a fundamental fact – and something being zero-grounded – like, perhaps, the 
existence of the empty set. Many of the points noticed and visited en passant by Fine 
are likely to be explored in detail by other authors.  
 
Another important selling-point of the collection is the authoritative introduction, 
where the editors describe the state of the art in the debate. It will serve as a useful 
reference work. Correia and Schnieder also helpfully identify questions for further 
research, for example in the section on the logic of grounding. Their summaries of the 
papers in the collection are also a welcome service to the reader. They illuminate the 
relationship between the different papers, as well as to the wider literature, which is 
occasionally obscured by terminological differences between authors.  
 
The introduction also does a very good job at relating current work to the history of 
philosophy. The editors touch on Plato’s Eutyphro contrast and on Bolzano’s theory. 
Further, they note that grounding is reminiscent of the relation of providing a 
sufficient reason, deployed by the rationalists. The principle of sufficient reason 
(PSR) requires that the converse of that relation is serial – everything has a sufficient 
reason. The editors find that “[w]hat is perhaps most puzzling about the rationalist 
tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the PSR was often accepted” (p. 5). 
Since the arguments offered for it were spurious, the rationalists are most charitably 
interpreted as taking the principle to be self-evident. Interestingly, many 
contemporary theorists of grounding do not require that grounding is serial. They 
allow that some facts are ungrounded. But they tend to take the irreflexivity of 
grounding to be self-evident. But if the relation in question is transitive and well-
founded, as many think it is, then the rationalists’ seriality and the contemporary 
theorists’ irreflexivity are incompatible. Perhaps the rationalists would be puzzled by 
the certainty which some contemporary theorists assert that grounding is irreflexive.  
 
At any rate, the contemporary discussion is likely to benefit from confrontation with 
some relevant historical work. Michael Della Rocca’s contribution, “Violations of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason (in Leibniz and Spinoza)” (ch. 5) tries to illustrate this 
point, and more ambitiously, to “elide the apparent differences between historical and 
non-historical approaches to philosophy” (p. 164). There is much illuminating 
material in this essay. However, the reader’s patience gets a bit strained when she is 
led down some false alleys before being shown the monistic dénouement she has 
probably been expecting for a while.   
 
The deployment of grounding and cognate notions in the history of philosophy shows 
that grounding is not just an industry of some isolated corner of contemporary 
analytic metaphysics, as is sometimes alleged. So the historical work in this volume 
may help convince more philosophers that it is a legitimate and worthwhile topic of 
study. Since many would deny it that status, in conversation if not in print, much of 
the existing literature on grounding is apologetic in character. An influential article on 
grounding, which appeared as late as 2010, starts with the sentence “This essay is a 
plea for ideological toleration” (Gideon Rosen, “Metaphysical Dependence: 
Grounding and Reduction”, in Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann (eds.) Modality. 
Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Oxford University Press). It is a very useful 
feature of this volume that it gives a voice to the critics of grounding. It is hard to say 
why one finds a concept intelligible, and for that reason, sceptics rarely do it. Chris 
Daly, in “Skepticism about Grounding” (ch. 2), does a good job articulating his 
reasons.  
 
Paul Audi’s paper, “A Clarification and defense of the notion of grounding” (ch. 3), 
ably responds to some of Daly’s argument. Audi also articulates a distinctive 
conception of grounding, on which its relata are “wordly” rather than “conceptual”, 
and correspondingly rather coarse-grained.   
 
Jonathan Schaffer’s “Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity” (ch. 5) fruitfully 
applies theoretical tools from the study of causation to grounding. Schaffer argues that 
the binary relation of partial grounding is not transitive, contrary to received wisdom. 
He suggests a framework in which grounding does not relate facts, but differences, 
and expressed by contrastive locutions of the form “the fact that A rather than B 
grounds the fact that C rather than D”. There is a certain mismatch, however, between 
Schaffer’s explanation of why the assumption of transitivity is natural (p. 122), and 
his counterexample to transitivity. The former only applies to the notion of full 
grounding, while the latter only concerns partial grounding. If there are 
counterexamples to the transitivity of full grounding, they will be of a different sort 
from Schaffer’s.   
 
The contributions mentioned so far are explicitly concerned with grounding (or, in 
one case, providing a sufficient reason). Two further contributions are so implicitly. 
David Liggins’ “Truth-makers and dependence” (ch. 10) discusses the relationship 
between truth-maker theory and the theory of grounding – or “dependence”, in his 
terminology. Stephen Barker’s “Expressivism about making and truth-making” (ch. 
11) argues that grounding claims – “making-the-case” claims, in his terminology – 
express a commitment to a derivation only using certain introduction rules.   
 
The rest of the book deal with related topics. Kathrin Koslicki’s “Varieties of 
ontological dependence” (ch. 7) and E.J. Lowe’s “Asymmetrical dependence in 
individuation” (ch. 8) are concerned with the topic of ontological dependence. 
Koslicki argues that extant accounts of ontological dependence conflate two 
importantly different relations, which she calls constituent-dependence and feature-
dependence. The first paradigmatically holds between a set and its members, and the 
latter between an accident and the substance to which it belongs. Lowe argues against 
certain structuralist ontologies.   
 
Grounding and ontological dependence (henceforth simply “dependence”) are both 
topics in hyperintensional metaphysics, and both have to with a certain kind of 
metaphysical priority: the ground is thought to be prior to what it grounds, and the 
dependent thing posterior to what it depends on. But beyond that, the relationship 
between the two topics is not straightforward, and deserves more discussion than it 
receives in this volume.  
 
Paradigmatically, grounding relates facts, while dependence relates entities in other 
categories, such as objects or properties. But even if we are happy to acknowledge 
dependence among facts, that relation seems different from grounding. To a first 
approximation, grounding has to do with sufficient conditions, and dependence with 
necessary conditions: if A grounds B, then A is a sufficient condition for B, and if A 
depends on B, then B is a necessary condition for A. A disjunctive fact is grounded by 
its true disjunct, for example, but it does not typically depend on it. So there appear to 
be instances of grounding without dependence. Moreover, a conjunctive fact 
presumably depends on each of its disjuncts, but is not grounded by it – at least not 
fully grounded. Whether a fact is always partially grounded by a fact it depends on is 
not clear to me.  
 
In their introduction, Correia and Schnieder suggest that one might wish to define a 
notion of dependence among entities  – “existential dependence”, they call it – in 
terms of grounding: “x existentially depends on y iff some fact about y grounds the 
fact that x exists” (p. 25). But it would not appear to be possible to define grounding 
in terms of dependence. So a theory of dependence does not tell us anything directly 
about grounding. Of course, one might discuss ontological dependence as an example 
of a concept that can be defined or at least illuminated in terms of grounding. This, 
however, is not what Koslicki and Lowe are doing. Moreover, ontological dependence 
is hardly unique as a concept that can be illuminated in terms of grounding. If Gideon 
Rosen (op. cit.) is right, the notion of an intrinsic property has an analysis in terms of 
ground. But we would not, on that account, expect to find papers on intrinsicality in a 
volume on grounding. So either there is a further, non-obvious connection between 
grounding and dependence, or the book under review is best seen as dealing with 
ontological dependence as a subject in its own right, rather than one that is included 
because of its tight relationship to grounding.  
 
The two papers not yet mentioned, J. Robert G. Williams’ “Requirements on Reality” 
(ch. 6) and Jody Azzouni’s “Simple Metaphysics and ‘ontological dependence’” (ch. 
9), contribute to the debate on metaontology. What sort of entities should we believe 
exist, and what is the ontological footprint of a given theory? On the face of it, these 
questions are not concerned with grounding, or dependence. However, Jonathan 
Schaffer (“On what grounds what”, in David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan 
Wasserman (eds), Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, 
Oxford University Press, 2009) has influentially created a link between these 
questions (whether Schaffer is concerned with grounding or dependence, in our 
terminology, is not clear to me). The link goes roughly as follows: if an entity is 
grounded (or dependent), then it is an “ontological free lunch” – we should believe in 
its existence, and we do not thereby increase our ontological foot-print. Both Williams 
and Azzouni, whose contributions build on work published elsewhere, can be seen as 
challenging Schaffer’s link. They outline strategies of keeping one’s ontology small 
without rejecting entrenched tenets of common sense or science. Williams ends by 
comparing his account to theories of grounding, and Azzouni by arguing against 
theories of ontological dependence.  
 
This excellent collection is not only a welcome addition to the still relatively sparse 
literature on grounding, but will also set the stage for much subsequent literature. The 
book will be indispensable to those working on grounding or ontological dependence, 
and is likely to be useful to many in other areas of philosophy as well.  
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